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Case Comments
Contracts: Reasonable Duration Inference in
Exclusive Franchise Agreements
Plaintiff, a wholesale beer distributor, sued defendant brewery for breach of an oral contract made in 1950 which allegedly
provided that the former was to be the latter's exclusive distributor in south Minneapolis and neighboring suburbs for as
long as plaintiff performed its undertaking. Plaintiff alleged
that defendant had terminated the agreement without cause in
1963 after the plaintiff had made substantial investments in distribution facilities. The district court sustained defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the contract, as
pleaded, was terminable at will since it lacked mutuality of obligation. On appeal the Eighth Circuit reversed, hoZding that an
exclusive franchise dealer may claim breach of contract where the
dealer, at the supplier's instance, has invested in costly distribution facilities and the agreement has been terminated without
affording the dealer an opportunity to recoup this investment.
Clausen & Sons, Incorporatedv. Theo. Hamm Brewing Company,

395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968).
Exclusive franchise agreements,1 which have recently become common devices used by manufacturers in marketing their
products,2 generally give to the dealer the exclusive right of
distribution in a given geographical area and the right to purchase, on agreed terms, the quantity of product needed. The
dealer, in turn, agrees to buy the product from the supplier and
to promote and sell it in his territory. Frequently the dealer
must invest in warehouse facilities, extensive inventory, delivery
vehicles, advertising and other items necessary to facilitate the
product's distribution. 3 Either through design or oversight,
some terms are often not expressed in the franchise agreement.
Duration and rights of termination are frequently left indefi1. This kind of contract has also been referred to by various courts

and commentators as an exclusive "sales-agency" contract or an exclusive "distributorship" contract. As used in this Comment the terms
are meant to be synonymous with "exclusive franchise contract." See
2 A. Coamm-, CONTRACTS

§ 155 (1963).

2. Superior Concrete Accessories v. Kemper, 284 S.W.2d 482, 489
(Mo. 1955). See generally Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-FranchiseCancellations,1967 DuKE L.J. 465.
3. E.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co.,
64 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1933); J.C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers
Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
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nite.4 Where the dealer has made substantial investments in
reliance on the franchise agreement, arbitrary termination with
little or no notice can be disasterous. Until recently, however,
courts have disallowed dealers' breach of contract actions, holding that exclusive franchise agreements which fail to contain
provisions for duration or termination are terminable at the will
of either party. 5 Historically, two arguments have been utilized
to support this approach. First, it is thought that contracts that
are indefinite or uncertain as to material terms are void, at least
insofar as they are executory, 6 as this uncertainty or indefiniteness renders the contract incapable of enforcement.7 Further,
it is often said that it is without the court's province to remake
the contract for the parties." Secondly, and closely related, is
the contention that these agreements lack mutuality of obligation
and are therefore not binding contractsY The precise concept that
courts wish to convey by use of the term, "mutuality of obligation" is seldom made clear. However, the courts which have
held that its absence makes the contract terminable at will
have said essentially that neither party is bound unless both
parties are. 10
Recently, several courts have rejected both of the above positions and have held that the supplier cannot necessarily terminate at will in cases where the dealer has made heavy investments in reliance on the franchise agreement.11 In response to
4. See Gellhorn, supra note 3. It is easy to understand the omis-

sion of these terms. The parties do not contemplate termination and
both are reluctant to bind themselves to an unproven arrangement for
a long period of time.
5. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not been directly presented

with the questions of duration and termination rights in an exclusive
franchise contract of indefinite duration for many years.

In Victor

Talking Machine Co. v. Lucker, 128 Minn. 171, 150 N.W. 790 (1915), and
Hoover v. Perkins Windmill & Axe Co., 41 Minn. 143, 42 N.W. 866
(1889), the Minnesota court held that the contracts were terminable at
will. However, as the court in Clausen points out, in neither of those
cases was detrimental reliance shown. 395 F.2d at 390.

6. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. v. Minot Beverage Co., 93 F. Supp.
994 (D.N.D. 1950); Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet Citizens' Brewing Co., 254
Ill. 215, 98 N.E. 263 (1912).

7. See, e.g., Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., 75 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1935);

Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1933).
8. Thomson v. Gortner, 73 Md. 474, 21 A. 371 (1891).

9. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno

Co., 64 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1933); Goodman v. Motor Prods. Corp., 9
Ill. App. 2d 57, 132 N.E.2d 356 (1956).
10. Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 102 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1939);
A. Santaella & Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co., 155 F. 719 (8th Cir. 1907).

11. In the situations in which the dealer has not yet detrimentally
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the uncertainty objection, recent decisions argue that a reasonable durationand a reasonable notice period prior to termination
may be implied. 12 When a distributor has invested heavily in
reliance on the agreement, "justice" requires that a reasonabZe
duration be implied in law.13 Additionally, such a period is
implied in fact because businessmen certainly must intend that
these agreements are to continue for a reasonable time. 14 Sim
ilarly, a reasonable notice period can be implied both in law and
in fact on the same grounds.
With respect to the mutuality objection, courts have recently
taken the position that mutuality is merely another word for
consideration and with the existence of valid consideration running from both parties there is a binding contract. 5 In the
context of the exclusive franchise agreement, the dealer's investment in a distribution facility can constitute the wanted consideration to support the supplier's implied promise to continue the
6
agreement for a reasonable time.
In the instant case the Eighth Circuit, interpreting Minnesota law, rejected the lower court's conclusion that the contract
pleaded was terminable at will in that it lacked mutuality of
obligation.1 7 The circuit court said that mutuality of obligation
in this context is synonomous to consideration, 18 and since detrimental reliance has long been regarded as valid consideration in
Minnesota it was error for the lower court to dismiss without
hearing evidence on plaintiff's investments in a distribution facility.' 9 Further, the court indicated that where such consideration exists, the dealer must be given an opportunity to recoup
29
his investment.
relied on the exclusive franchise contract, or in which it can not be
said that any substantial investment was made in reliance on the agreement, there is no compelling reason not to allow termination at will.
12. See, e.g., San Francisco Brewing Corp. v. Bowman, 52 Cal. 2d
607, 613-14, 343 P.2d 1, 4 (1959).
13. Id. at 614, 343 P.2d at 5.
14. See, e.g., J.C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp.,
123 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
15. Hunt Foods, Inc. v. Phillips, 248 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1957); J.C.
Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484 (N.D.
Cal. 1954).
16. J.C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp.
484 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distribs., Inc. v. Drewrys
Ltd., U.S.A., 256 Iowa 899, 906, 129 N.W.2d 731, 736 (1964).
17. Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d
388, 391 (8th Cir. 1968).
18. Id. at 389.
19. Id. at 390.
20. Id. at 391.
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The recent trend in general and the Clausen decision in particular represent a desirable departure from earlier decisions
for several reasons. First, the exclusive franchise agreement
can be viewed most realistically as an agreement of more than a
single nature.21 It cannot be described as a mere agency contract; rather, it has additional characteristics.2 2 The earlier decisions which held these agreements terminable at will either
failed to recognize this complex nature23 or failed to regard it as
relevant to the questions of duration and terminability. 24 A
reasonable duration has long been implied in agency contracts if
the agent has given the principal some consideration in addition
to his agency services. 25 Similarly, employment contracts have
been declared not terminable at will where the employee has
furnished additional consideration. 26 Thus, where the dealer has
made substantial investments to further the distribution of the
supplier's product-in addition to distributing the product-it can
be argued that this additional consideration should render the
agreement enforceable for a reasonable duration. 7
Earlier decisions which held such agreements terminable at
will often seemed to equate mutuality of obligation with mutual
rights of termination. 28 These decisions implied that there was
something essentially unfair about holding a supplier to a reasonable duration when the distributor could terminate at will.29
21. For a description of the characteristics of the type of exclusive franchise contract with which this Comment deals see text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
22. In a sales contract, typically, one party to the agreement, the
buyer, purchases goods from the seller and then must assume the risk
of their loss or damage. In an agency contract, one party, the agent,
often promises to provide personal services or otherwise promote the
interests of the other, the principal. See J.C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Des Moines Blue
Ribbon Distribs., Inc. v. Drewrys Ltd., U.S.A., 256 Iowa 899, 906-07, 129
N.W.2d 731, 736 (1964).
23. See, e.g., Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 102 F.2d 425,
426-27 (8th Cir. 1939).
24. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co., 64
F.2d 224, 228 (8th Cir. 1933); Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. v. Minot Beverage Co., 93 F. Supp. 994 (D.N.D. 1950).
25.

See 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1027A, at 2852 (rev. ed. 1936).

26. See, e.g., Newhall v. Journal Printing Co., 105 Minn. 44, 117
N.W. 228 (1908). See also 20 L.R.A. (n.s.) 899 (1909) (comments to

Newhall).

27. See cases cited note 22 supra.
28. See, e.g., Meredith v. John Deere Plow Co., 185 F.2d 481 (8th

Cir. 1950); Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. v. Minot Beverage Co., 93 F.
Supp. 994 (D.N.D. 1950); Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet Citizens' Brewing
Co., 254 ll. 215, 98 N.E. 263 (1912).
29. See cases cited note 28 supra.
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These courts failed to take into account several significant
factors. First, in industries where manufacturer or supplier
franchises are scarce, a distributor often becomes economically
"locked-in" to continue the contract. Because of the substantial
investment in distribution facilities it is not feasible for a distributor to terminate the agreement before the relationship has
continued for a reasonable time.30 Thus, in such cases the fear
that a supplier is at the mercy of a distributor who may arbitrarily terminate the agreement at any time is mitigated by the
distributor's own self-interest.
Second, even if a distributor were to terminate before the
agreement had run a reasonable time, it is unlikely that the
supplier would sustain damages beyond his loss of bargain. 31
Although there are exceptions, it is usually the distributor who
makes large investments in reliance on the contract while typically the supplier makes no such expenditures.
Third, there is no valid reason to assume as a premise that
the distributor necessarily has a right to terminate at will. 32 In
situations where the supplier has detrimentally relied on the
agreement at the instance of the distributor it arguably could be
found that the distributorhad impliedly promised to continue for
a reasonable time also.
The Clausen decision is particularly desirable in that it lends
some substance to the term "reasonable duration.".33 The court
implies that the formula should be that length of time which
would afford a party an opportunity to recoup his investment. 34
30. Cf. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co. v. Minot Beverage Co., 93 F.
Supp. 994, 996 (D.N.D. 1950). The cases concerned with exclusive franchise contracts evidence the general proposition that it is the supplier
who more often arbitrarily terminates the contract of indefinite dura-

tion and the distributor who brings the breach of contract action.
31.

The court in the instant case limits recovery to reliance dam-

ages. But see San Francisco Brewing Corp. v. Bowman, 52 Cal. 2d 607,
615, 343 P.2d 1,5 (1959) (court implies that expectancy damages might
be awarded).

32.

Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388,

391 (8th Cir. 1968). In Clausen, the Eighth Circuit notes that Minnesota
courts are prone to construe any contract as not being terminable at will
and that provisions which would limit termination rights of parties
can be implied from the agreement. Id. at 391 nn.3 & 4. It is very
doubtful then (at least insofar as the federal courts are concerned) that
even the distributor whose obligation is indefinite can terminate the
agreement prior to giving reasonable notice.
33. Other courts holding similar contracts not terminable at will
often determine "reasonable duration" simply on a case-by-case basis.
See, e.g., General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors, Inc., 253 N.C. 459,
117 S.E.2d 479 (1960).
34. 395 F.2d 388, 391 (8th Cir. 1968).
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While the formula is definite enough to provide a rational basis
for enforcement it is flexible enough to provide an equitable
measure of damages. For example, if a distributor were not economically "locked-in" to continuing performance either because
his investment was nominal or similar franchises were easily obtainable, the time required to give him an opportunity to recoup
his investment would be shorter and his damages therefore
smaller. On the other hand, if he had made a large investment
in reliance on the agreement and similar franchises were not
easily attainable, it would take a longer period to recover his
investment and his damages would consequently be larger.
The Clausen decision is, therefore, a welcome change from
earlier decisions and, at least insofar as the federal courts are
concerned, brings Minnesota law into accord with recent decisions of other jurisdictions. 35 The result is desirable because it
recognizes certain exclusive franchise contracts as being something more than a mere agency contract; it is also supported by
stronger policy justifications than earlier decisions.

Torts: Manufacturer's Duty to Design Automobile
Reasonably Safe to Occupy in Collision
Plaintiff, the driver of an automobile, received severe bodily
injuries allegedly caused in part by the rearward displacement
of the steering column when the vehicle he was driving was involved in a head-on collision. In a suit against the manufacturer
of the automobile, the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer's
design of the steering mechanism was defective because it increased the chance of severe injuries whenever the vehicle was
involved in a head-on collision.1 The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer, finding no duty to
construct an automobile that is safe to occupy in a collision.2
35. See, e.g., C.C. Hauff Hardware, Inc. v. Long Mfg. Co., 257 Iowa
1127, 136 N.W.2d 276 (1965); Colony Liquor Distribs., Inc. v. Jack
Daniel Distillery-Lem Motlow Prop., Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 247, 254
N.Y.S.2d 547 (1964).
1. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged (1) negligent design of the
steering assembly; (2) negligent failure to warn of the alleged latent
danger to anyone occupying the driver's seat; and (3) breach of express
and implied warranties of merchantability for the vehicle's intended
use. At the trial on the merits the jury found for defendant General
Motors by a general verdict.
2. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 274 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn.
1967). The case was tried according to Michigan law by stipulation
of the parties.
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a
manufacturer of an automobile is under a duty to design vehicles
so as to avoid subjecting the occupants to an unreasonable risk
of harm in the event of an automobile accident which is, or
should be, forseeable by the manufacturer. Larsen v. General
Motors Corporation,391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
3
After the landmark MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company
decision in 1916, the trend in products liability law has been to
increase the scope of a manufacturer's liability for marketing
unsafe products. 4 Initially, negligence was the sole basis of
manufacturer liability to the consumer. More recently there has
developed from the law of sales a doctrine of strict liability
whereby the manufacturer, regardless of his negligence, is liable
to the consumer for injuries arising out of the use of his product.5 While strict liability was originally limited to certain
extends to
products, 6 today its application in many jurisdictions
7
nearly all products capable of injuring the consumer.
In assessing liability, courts have distinguished between defects caused by the design of the product and those arising out
of the construction of the product. Design defects involve an
error in the plans and specifications that are adopted by the
manufacturer in his manufacturing process, while construction
defects are a departure from the plans and specifications employed. Although both design and construction negligence have
been recognized in most jurisdictions, courts have seemed reluctant to impose liability in cases involving design defects, s
partially out of fear that judges and juries are not qualified to
pass upon the manufacturer's design. 9 In addition is the fre3.

217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

4. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the

Consumer), 50 MniNN. L. Rmv. 791 (1966). For a review of those jurisdictions in which strict liability has been accepted, see id. at 794-99 and
CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 1 4050. For a review of the almost universal
acceptance of a manufacturer's liability based upon negligence see 1 L.
FRUmER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LiABIrrY

§ 5.03(1); W. PROssER, LAW

OF TORTs, ch. 19 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
5.

See PRossER, supra note 4.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 805.
8.

Noel, Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design or Directions for Use

of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962). See also Dillingham v. Chevrolet
Motor Co., 17 F. Supp. 615 (D.Okla. 1936).
9. Manufacturers are generally held "... to an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials and processes relating to his product." Pipe
Welding Supply Co. v. Gas Atmospheres, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 191, 200
(N.D. Ohio 1961). See also Wright v. Carter Prods., 244 F.2d 53, 59
(2d Cir. 1957); Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 372, 136 A.2d 626,

632 (1957).
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quently advanced argument that a "judgment for a particular
plaintiff may open the door to many additional claims and
suits."'1
In contrast to a construction defect, a design defect
supposedly infects all units produced by the manufacturer and
thus liability resulting from the latter could be the basis for litigation by all injured persons possessing the product. Contributing to this hesitance is the contention that adverse judgments may cause many widely used products to be removed from
the market, resulting in economic dislocations for both the consumers and employees of the manufacturer."'
In defining the standard of care required of the manufacturer in designing a safe product, the courts have relied on the
character of the product's use. The rule is stated:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design
which makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he should expect
to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for
physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable
care in the adoption of a safe plan or design.12
Thus, a manufacturer's liability extends only to injuries arising
out of the use for which the product was manufactured. "Intended use" has become the focal point of much case analysis
involving design negligence,' 3 and is particularly relevant to
automobile safety factors.
While little disagreement exists as to the relevance of intended use, there has been considerable confusion in defining the
doctrine. In the past, and in some jurisdictions today, intended use is narrowly construed so that a manufacturer is liable only when his product is unfit for the particular purpose for
which it was made.' 4 Now, however, intended use is generally
10. Noel, supra note 8, at 816.
11. Id.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965) (emphasis added).
See also PROSSER at 665-70.
13. E.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
14. Rosin v. International Harvester Co., 262 Minn. 445, 115 N.W.2d
50 (1962). In Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 923 (1955), a baby bathinette, while perfectly
satisfactory for the particular purpose of attending to infants, constituted a fire hazard because it was partially constructed of very inflammable magnesium. During a bathroom fire in the home of the plaintiff,
the magnesium became ignited and in the ensuing conflagration the
plaintiff was severely burned, partly by the magnesium. The jury was
instructed to find for the defendant manufacturer if they found that
the bathinette itself was not the cause of the original fire. On appeal,
the instruction and the verdict were upheld for the defendant.
In Poore v. Edgar Bros. Co., 33 Cal. App. 2d 6, 90 P.2d 808 (1939),
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given a much broader construction in keeping with the general
expansion of the scope of a manufacturer's liability. One such
construction is that a manufacturer must design his product so
that it will be safe for all forseeable uses that could be classified
as "normal." 15 A corollary of this principle is that the product must ". . . fairly meet any emergency of use which could

reasonably be anticipated."'16 Therefore, the manufacturer
must not only insure a safe product for any anticipated "nor17
mal" use, but must also insure such safety under slight abuse
8
or exposure to some foreseeable emergency condition.
the plaintiff was cut by broken window glass that had been used to
replace the regular safety glass, when his car became involved in an
automobile accident. Although safety glass was available at the time,
the court held that the glass was not intended to receive such a blow
when the car was being operated in a normal manner, and affirmed a
verdict for the defendant, a dealer in used cars.
15. Philips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235
P.2d 857 (1951). The defendant constructed his chairs with a plywood
back which was attached to an aluminum tubing frame. While the back
was secure enough to permit one to sit in the chair, it was not safe
enough to permit one to place weight on the back when dismounting
from the chair after standing on it. The court held that the manufacturer was required to anticipate this use of its chair and protect
against the hazards connected with it. See also PROSSER at 668, and
cases cited therein. Here it is difficult to say precisely how far the
manufacturer's duty extends to guard against possible uses of his product. Prosser suggests, when speaking of the requirement of a warning
in cases of allergic reactions to food and drugs, that factors such as "the
seriousness of the harm to be expected to the allergic user and the

expert knowledge of the defendant should be taken into consideration

when fixing the limits on a manufacturer's duty to warn. PROSSER at
669. Perhaps these factors could be employed in defining the extent of
"normal" use.
16. Davlin v. Henry Ford & Son, 20 F.2d 317, 319 (6th Cir. 1927).
17. Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir.
1954) (petcock used to drain airbrake system on bus broken off because
of the combined negligence of the manufacturer in placing it too close
to the ground and the bus driver's excessive speed over a debrisstrewn road); Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co.,
248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688 (1956) (pulley shattered when tractor
driven too fast in low gear).
18. Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 219 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1963)
(failure to design system that would arrest the rotation of an airplane
propeller if the engine were to fail while the plane was in flight).
The "intended use" terminology employed obviously leads to considerable confusion and in some instances "unintended use" would be
equally appropriate. In Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th
Cir. 1962), an infant swallowed some poisonous furniture polish and died.
Obviously, no one intends that a child ingest these substances. The
Spruill court apparently recognized this semantic difficulty when it
said," 'intended use' is merely a convenient measure of 'reasonable foreseeability of harm,"' and affirmed a verdict for the plaintiff. The
Spruill case is typical of those cases dealing with an unavoidably
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Since it is simply uneconomic in many cases and impossible
in others to guard against all potential liability, a manufacturer
is permitted to avoid liability if the consumer is given adequate
warning of the product's dangers. In cases where the nature of
the product reveals its obvious dangers, no warning is required. 19
If the dangers inherent in the product are not readily apparent,
however, the manufacturer is required to give a full and ade20
quate warning.
With respect to a vehicle manufacturer's duty to design,
there has been a reluctance to extend liability to injuries which
arise from the absence of safety factors in the product. While
case authority exists supporting a broader liability, 21 the courts
have generally applied a narrow and literal definition of intended
use to immunize automobile manufacturers from liability for
failure to design safety devices into their products.2 2 Illustrative of such an approach is Evans v. General Motors Corporation.23 The plaintiff there alleged that injury resulted from the
dangerous product in that they dispense with the "intended use" terminology in favor of a "forseeability of harm" test. Steele v. Rapp,

183 Kan. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958); Haberly v. Reardon, 319 S.W.2d 859

(Mo. 1958); Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
19. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 472, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950).
20. Tomao v. A.P. De Sanno & Son, 209 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1954); Rice
v. Gulf States Paint Co., 406 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Foster v.
Ford Motor Co., 139 Wash. 341, 246 P. 945 (1926). Recently, however, it
has been suggested that a manufacturer might be held liable even when
a warning is given, if the product creates grave dangers. 2 F. HAIRPE &
F. JAM s, Tm LAw OF TORTS, §§ 28.3-28.8 (1956); Noel, supra note 8, at
845, 862. In Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product
Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301, 307 n.21 (1967), the author suggests that two
cases have followed this view: Iacurci v. Lummus Co., 340 F.2d 868, 872
(2d Cir. 1965); Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 73-75,
215 N.E.2d 465, 467 (1966).
21. E.g., Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, 106 Cal. App. 2d 650,
235 P.2d 857 (1951); Ringstad v. I. Magnin & Co., 39 Wash. 2d 923, 239
P.2d 848 (1952).
22. General Motors Corp. v. Muncy, 367 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1037 (1967); Shumard v. General Motors
Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corp.,
264 F. Supp. 1010, 1011 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Schemel v. General Motors
Corp., 261 F. Supp. 134, 135 (S.D. Ind. 1966); Kahn v. Chrysler Corp.,
221 F. Supp. 677, 679 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163
Cal. App. 2d 393, 395, 329 P.2d 605, 607 (1958). There has, as cited by
the Larsen opinion, been a case imposing liability upon an employer for
designing a truck which, due to its unusual design, required the driver to
keep the door open when giving a hand signal. When the truck was
struck by a car, the driver, an employee, fell through the open door and
was crushed when the truck fell upon him. Railway Express Agency v.
Spain, 249 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952).
23. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
This case has received extensive and generally unfavorable treatment
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manufacturer's production of a vehicle with an X-type frame in-

stead of a box-type perimeter frame, which provided more protection in a side-on collision. The court, however, affirmed the

manufacturer's summary judgment and stated that, "[t]he intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participa-

tion in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's
ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may oc24

cur."

In Larsen itself, the court cited a number of authorities for
the proposition that a "manufacturer's duty of design and construction extends to producing a product that is reasonably fit
for its intended use and free of hidden defects that could render
it unsafe for such use," indicating that "the issue narrows on the
proper interpretation of 'intended use.'-"25 However, general
negligence principles seem to have been pursued, as the court
concluded that the likelihood of harm was great,26 that the
gravity of the harm was serious (by implication), and that the
burden imposed upon the manufacturer was sufficiently small
so that a duty could be created. 27 In examining the burden of
providing safety devices, the court held that a manufacturer is
not obligated to construct an accident-proof vehicle but one
which would "...
avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable
risk of injury in the event of a collision." 28 The technology
employed in this design should be "... . consonant with the state
of the art to minimize the effect of accidents" 29 and employ
"... many common-sense factors in design, which are or should
be well known to the manufacturer. . .."0
To meet the argument that the driver of the automobile
was aware of the risk involved in any automobile accident and
therefore the manufacturer had no duty to warn of any potenin Note, Manufacturer'sLiability for an "Uncrashworthy" Automobile, 52
CoRNmL L.Q. 444 (1967); Note, Liability For Negligent Automobile Design, 52 IowA L. Rzv. 953 (1967); Comment, 80 HARv. L. REv. 688 (1967).
24. 359 F.2d at 825.
25. 391 F.2d at 501.

26. ".. . a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will result in collisions and injury-producing impacts." Id. at
502.

27. When Larsen was retried according to the Eighth Circuit opinion, the trial court judge must have interpreted the decision as an extension of the intended use approach. At the conclusion of the case he
charged the jury, "The normal and intended use of an automobile
includes collisions and injury-producing impacts." Record at 2088.
28. 391 F.2d at 502.
29.

Id. at 503.

30. Id. See also note 9 supra.
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tial dangers,3 1 the court simply replied that the danger was
latent and demanded a warning.3 2- Damages are to be fixed so
that ". . . the manufacturer should be liable for that portion of
the damage or injury ... over and above the damage or injury
that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or
' 33
collision absent the defective design.
To the extent that the court disposed of the narrow and
literal analysis of intended use that had characterized previous
decisions concerning the manufacturer's duty to design, the Larsen decision represents an advance in product liability law. The
term "intended use" has never been an adequate means of defining the manufacturer's duty.34 The scope of negligence liability should depend on the exigencies of all the parties involved. When faced with the problem of defining the scope of
design liability for other products, the courts have recognized
the inadequacy of such a literal interpretation of intended use. 35
It is not entirely clear whether the Larsen court defined intended use in terms of reasonable foreseeability, or discarded
the concept entirely in favor of traditional negligence principles. However, regardless of the theory, the court has recognized that the law of products liability should provide the consumer with optimum protection consonant with the realities of
automobile transportation in the mid-twentieth century.
As the Larsen court recognized, tort law questions of duty
are decided by weighing the probability and gravity of any possible harm arising from the defendant's conduct, against the
burden imposed upon him in taking precautions to avoid that
harm.36 From a reading of Larsen, it appears that the court
does not possess a basic understanding of some of the problems
31. See note 19 supra.
32. 391 F.2d at 505. Here the court seems to be creating a new
function for a warning in the products liability area. Since every automobile driver knows that it is dangerous to participate in collisions,
the reasonable driver would conduct himself so as to avoid just that.
Thus, the manufacturer must warn the purchaser of the increment of
danger inherent in the manufacturer's vehicle over and above the normal risk that would be associated with a safe car. It may be that the
court is attempting to achieve "vigorous competition in the development and marketing of safety improvements," one of the goals of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-563,
30 Stat. 718, quoted in 86 CCH PRoD. LiB. REP. f 9 (1966). This was
hinted at in the opinion. 391 F.2d at 506.
33. 391 F.2d at 503.
34. See note 18 supra.
35. Id.
36. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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inherent in applying this concept to automobile design cases.3 7
Seat belts, for example, have been regarded as a safety device;
however, recent studies have indicated that seat belts may constitute a considerable danger to the wearer in some crash situations.38 This uncertainty serves to illustrate a fundamental
difficulty in imposing duties regarding automobile safety design: many safety devices which attempt to minimize particular
dangers in some types of collisions often increase the dangers
associated with other crash situations. This being the case, it
is questionable whether a jury can adequately decide whether,
on the whole, a particular safety device is in reality a safety aid
or a safety hazard. Arguably, nonjudicial proceedings, perhaps
administrative, are more capable of dealing with such a question.39 Furthermore, if juries are the bodies that ultimately determine the reasonableness of a particular design, two conclusions
appear inevitable. First, a manufacturer will not know in advance exactly what is required of him.40 Second, the decision of
juries may vary from case to case as to the safety value of a particular design, possibly resulting in conflicting rules41 to which
a manufacturer cannot possibly conform.
It should be noted that in all of the foregoing cases, and for
that matter all appellate court cases prior to Larsen, liability has
only been imposed when the purported design defect caused the
accident and the injury. 42 While the matter of causation has
not been discussed in the opinions, it may be that judges and
37. The court referred to the "many common sense factors in design." 391 F.2d at 503.
38. 52 Mm. L. REV. 918, 921 (1968).
39. This problem has been recognized by Congress and is one of the
purposes for the enactment of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. See
86 CCH PROD. LiAB. REP. 9 (1966). For other related reasons why an
administrative approach is preferable, see Comment, 80 HARv. L. REv.
688, 692-93 (1967). In order to understand the complexity of the problem, it is interesting to observe the difficulty the federal government has
had with exactly the alleged defect in Larsen. The original federal
standard applicable to the rear-ward displacement of the steering column was promulgated in June, 1965 (although it was only applicable to
vehicles purchased by federal agencies). At that time the maximum displacement was five inches at 20 miles per hour; now it is five inches at
30 miles per hour. See Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations, 23 C.F.R.
§ 255.21.
40. While this may not be a relevant question with respect to a
simple product, for the more complicated ones (automobiles) the cost of
retooling for a change may be quite burdensome in many automobile
design cases.
41. See Comment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 688, 692-93 (1967).
42.

But cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959)

(construction defect caused only injury).
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juries give considerable unconscious weight to it. Certainly
there would be a moral reluctance in making a remote manufacturer bear full or partial responsibility for an automobile
injury that resulted from the direct negligence of another driver.43 The instant case, however, leaves open the question of
dividing the damages among the manufacturer and other negligent parties. Many jurisdictions accept the rule that where two
or more tortfeasors are responsible for a single injury incapable
of any logical division, they are each liable for the whole injury
unless they can establish that the other tortfeasor caused a
greater portion of it. 4 4

In regard to the Larsen decision this

means that the automobile manufacturer may always have to
assume total liability in light of the difficulty of establishing
whose negligence caused which part of the injury.45 Furthermore, a negligent driver previously would not have been in any
43. At this point it may be asserted that the fact that a manufacturer has never been held liable for his failure to minimize injuries is
really irrelevant. It can be argued that since one of the objects of tort
law is to deter injury-producing conduct and the manufacturer is the
only party who can reduce traffic injuries through the introduction of
safer cars, then we should focus our attention upon his failure to do
so, rather than the precipitating cause of the accident. However, as
Prosser suggests, prevention of injury is not the only factor to be considered in determining tort liability. Others, he suggests, are the "Moral
Aspect of the Defendant's Conduct" and the "Convenience of Administration." PRossER at 16-23.
44. PRossEa at 250. See also Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425,
108 N.W.2d 33 (1961).
45. There may, however, be other factors involved in a design
negligence claim tending to work against the plaintiff and in favor of
the manufacturer. Because the plaintiff will have the burden of proving negligence in design, which entails considerable expense and preparation, plaintiffs may be reluctant to join the manufacturer. This
seems especially likely in view of the past successes of the auto industry
in defending these suits. In Larsen the jury returned a general verdict
for the defendant General Motors after it was retried according to the
Eighth Circuit decision. While the many issues submitted to the jury
prevent one from determining exactly why the plaintiff failed to sustain
his claim, it was apparent that the plaintiff incurred considerable expense in his efforts. Considering the resources available to a large
automobile manufacturer and the rather limited funds available to individual plaintiffs, it may be that the plaintiff's only effective method
of pursuing these claims will be through some sort of cooperative effort
among the individual plaintiffs. This would be extremely helpful for a
number of plaintiffs alleging identical design defects.
However, even if the plaintiffs manage to overcome the technical
and financial obstacles in a design negligence suit, there still remains
the formidable barrier of convincing the jury that a defect existed.
This will undoubtedly be the most difficult part of any suit alleging
negligent design. In fact, in Larsen the defendant introduced extensive
evidence to show that there would be no rearward displacement of a
steering column in relation to the ground in a front-end collision.
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position to recover damages sustained in an accident resulting
from his own negligence. Now it appears that a negligent
plaintiff may be able to recover from the manufacturer for those
injuries caused by the manufacturer's failure to incorporate ade46
quate safety devices in his automobiles.
The administrative implications of the Larsen decision are
very serious. 47 Certainly the amount of litigation stemming
from automobiles is staggering. If the Larsen decision were
accepted in all jurisdictions, it stands to reason that the amount
of litigation would increase immeasurably as plaintiffs seek to
recover under claims newly created. This consideration seems
particularly acute in light of the apparent retroactive effect of
the decision in applying to all cars presently in use. Furthermore, the decision will undoubtedly result in the joinder of
many automobile manufacturers in the typical personal injury
case resulting from collisions, a likely consequence of which is
8
the reduced prospect of settlements.

In the absence of authority requiring that an automobile
manufacturer be liable for negligence under the circumstances,
it is understandable that the court is reluctant to impose the
more onerous burden of strict liability. However, there is authority in Michigan which suggests that strict liability applies
to all products. 49 Other states have applied the doctrine to
automobile manufacturers under slightly different circumstances. 50 Furthermore, the court's reliance on a recent Michigan decision for the proposition that strict liability applies only
to inherently dangerous objects seems misplaced. 51 Even as46. A plaintiff may argue that he was only contributorily negligent
with respect to those injuries which he would have suffered in a
properly designed vehicle. This argument would be based upon the
principle of contributory negligence which says that a plaintiff is not

barred from recovering for injuries sustained from a risk which he
could not foresee. See PROSSER at 431-32.
47. PRossER at 334, recognizes that one of the factors to be considered by a court before imposing a duty is the convenience of administration. See also note 43 supra.
48. It would seem that some form of compulsory arbitration would
be a much more efficient method of handling these multi-party cases.
This approach would have the virtues of avoiding a complicated trial
by taking many of these cases out of the courts and avoiding the possibility that a jury might be influenced by the solvency of an automobile manufacturer when deciding upon the merits of a safety design.
49. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich.
120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
50. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960).
51. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d
129 (1965). Nowhere in Piercefield does the Michigan court refer to an
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suming there is no requirement that the product be inherently
dangerous, it is not clear that strict liability should be imposed
under the facts of the instant case. It is necessary to find that
the injury arose out of the intended use of the product. 52 Because of the greater burden imposed on the manufacturer
through strict liability, it is not unreasonable nor surprising that
the court was reluctant to define intended use as broadly for
strict liability purposes as it did for purposes of negligent de53
sign.
No one would deny that improvements in the safety aspect
of automobile design are needed. However, it is questionable
whether traditional negligence law is the most appropriate means
of solving the problem. It would appear that a federal administrative agency might be much more effective in processing design negligence claims than a common-law court. If such a step
is too drastic, courts could perhaps rely exclusively on standards promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act. In the absence of such standards and in light of
the need for both national uniformity and expertise in determining safety standards, courts should proceed with caution. 54

inherently dangerous product. See also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A, comment i at 362.
52. Prosser, supranote 4, at 824.
53. But see Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, 106 Cal. App. 2d
650, 235 P.2d 857 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
54. But see Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial
Process,55 CALF. L. REv. 645, 673-77 (1967).

